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Abstract
Recent cross-section studies of the demand for charitable g~v~ng, owner
occupied housing, capital gains realizations, and the supply of labor hours have
been careful to use prices net of income tax levies. The use of after-tax
prices in a behavioral equation is a direct consequence of utility maximization
under a budget constraint and cannot be objected to. Nevertheless, when most or
all of the variance in prices comes from differences in marginal tax rates,
questions can arise about the identification of structural parameters. The
variables which deterMine marginal tax rates, chiefly income and marital status,
are quite plausible determinants of the behavior being modelled, in addition to
any indirect effect they might have through the tax price. A non-linear depen-
dence amonti the explanatory variables of a linear regression is not a source of
bias provided the linear specification is known to be correct. Because the
function form of a demand equation is not known a priori, this identification
through funct'ional form is not persuasive. In this note we propose an instru-
mental variable estimation designed to exploit any independent variation pres-
ent, and which allows unbiased estimates of tax-price elasticities under quite
general conditions. The estimator is applied to the demand for charitable
giving. The tax-price elasticity of the demand for charitable giving is esti-
mated to be -1.23.
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and the supply of labor hours
(and sometime"s state) incoille tax
levies. The use of after-tax prices and wages in behavioral equations is a
direct consequence of utility maximization under a budget constraint and cannot
be objected to.5 Nevertheless, when most or all of the variance in prices
across observations comes from differences in marginal tax rates, questions can
arise about the identification of structural parameters in the model. It is not
the partial equilibrium nature of these regressions -- inevitable after all with
cross section data -- but the functional dependence among the explanator,y vari-
ables which causes the greatest discomfort. The variables which determine
marginal tax rates, chiefly income and marital status, are quite plausible
determinants of the behavior being modelled, in addition to any indirect effect
they might have through the tax-price. A non-linear dependence among the right-
hand side variables of a linear regression is not a source of bias provided the
linear specification is known to be the correct one. Because the functional
form of a demand equation cannot be known a priori this identification through
functional form cannot be persuasive.6
In particular, there will not usual~ be aQY theoretical basis for
excluding polymonial and interaction terms in the included variables. As more
of the plausible explanator,y variables are included, the tax price will approach
perfect colinearity with the remaining variables, yet if many are excluded, the
possibility that the tax price is mere~ proxy for an improperly excluded expla-
nator,y variable increases.
In this note we propose an instrumental variable estimator designed to
exploit sources of independent variation, which allows unbiased estimation of-2-
the tax-price elasticity under quite general conditions. The estimator is
applied to the demand for charitable giving. A charitable giving equation is an
appropriate test for this procedure because it represents the purest case of a
tax-price coefficient. That is, taxes are the sole source of variance in the
price. The deduction is also a non-trivial policy issue. In 1977 1.4% of gross
income was deducted for this reason, about as much as the capital gains deduc-
tion.
Since theory is not likely to govern the selection of functiona~ forlli, the
situation is hopeless unless some independent variation among the right hand
side variables can be found and exploited.7 Such variance is normally present in
tax-price regressions, and it arises from the complexity of the tax code.
Special provisions, including income averaging, the maximum tax on earned
income, the minimum tax on preferences, other deductions, disability income
exclusions, etc. all contribute to an apparently substantial departure of the
tax-price from perfect dependence on the included right hand side variable.
Nevertheless, these special provisions all relate to personal characteristics
some of which may have a direct effect on the desire or ability to give to
charity.
We use the variation in tax law across the states as a source of variance
in the tax-price which is independent of personal characteristics, and therefore
not subject to the criticism outlined above. 'Ihe approach is made possible by
the recent (1981) release of individual level tax return files with state iden-
tifiers for most taxpayers,8 and Qy a program created by the National Bureau of
Economic Research for calculating state tax liabilities from individual data.
We do not merely replace tax prices based upon federal tax rates with a better
number based on federal and state rates. The more comprehensive tax rate might
still be correlated with variables improperly excluded from the equation.-3-
Therefore, we propose a new approach using instrumental variables. A suitable
instrument must be correlated with the tax price but uncorrelated with any per-
sonal characteristics of the taxpayers. One possible instrument would be the
subsiqy rate in the taxpayer's state of residence evaluated at some fixed level
of income and deductions. The instrument used in Section V depends upon the
full distribution of income in the Tax Model sample.
The correctness of our instrument depends on two assumptions: first, that
state tax laws are inaependent of personal characteristics, and second, that
taxpayers react siroilar~ to state and federal taxes. The practicality of such
an estimator depends upon the partial correlation between the instrument and the
after-tax price. The standard error of the estimated coefficient will increase
in proportion to the inverse of the square root of that correlation. While this
qorrelation is bound to be weak -- state income taxes are on~ ll~ of federal
income tax revenues in 1978 -- tax-price coefficients are often extreme~
significant.
Section II of this paper provides a brief sumwary of previous cross-section
estimates of the demand for charitable giving. Section III is a derivation and
justification of the new instrumental variables estimator proposed in this
paper. Section IV includes a description of the data but ischief~ devoted to
the calculation of state income tax rates from federal tax return data. The
estimated demand functions, using the traditional and the·new s~ecificationsare
presented in Section V.- 4-
II. The Demand for Charitable Giving
In the United States, charitable donations of cash or assets are deductible
from gross income on the Federal tax return, at least for those taxpayers with
sufficient total deductions to justify itemizing their deductions. (A standard
deduction is alloted to each taxpayer without substantiation.) Similar rules
obtain under most state income tax laws. Under a progressive income tax this
results in a substantial variance across indivi~uals in the after-tax price of a
dollar of charitable giving and opens the way for cross-section studies of the
demand for charitable giving.
The seminal study in this area is Taussig (1967). Using a stratified ran-
dom sample of U.S. tax returns, Taussig estimated a log linear equation for
charitable giving as a function of disposable income, the marginal tax rate, and
several demographic variables.9 Separate linear rebressions were estimated for
each of five income classes. Taussig's remains the only published study to find
no significant price effect, largely because later investigators have recognized
the simultaneity of income and tax rate.lO Because the charitable giving
affects taxable income, and is therefore at least a partial determinant of the
tax rate, the observed tax price is endogenous. This problem is first
recognized by Feldstein and Taylor (1976) who substituted a so called "first
dollar tax rate", i.e. the tax rate that would have been obtained if the tax-
payer had no deductions for charitable giving. Disposable income is subJect to
the same bias, which is corrected in the identical manner.ll
Contributions of appreciated assets present an additional difficulty. When
an asset is sold only a fraction of the appreciation is included in taxable
income, but if it is donated to charity the full market value is deductible from- 5 -
taxable income. Suppose m is the tax rate on ordinary income and mc is the
effective tax rate on realized capital gains. Then the proceeds from the sale
of an asset with current value V and basis B will be V-mc(V-B). The reduc-
tion in tax liability if the asset is donated to charity is mY. The difference
in the proceeds to the taxpayer of the two dispositions of the asset, divided by
the value to the charity of the asset, is the unit price of the gift. That is,
Passet = 1 - mc(l-B/V) - m. Although gifts of cash and assets are recorded se~ar­
ate~ on the tax form the ratio of basis to current value is not available.
Feldstein and Taylor (1976) construct an unexpected price for each taxp~er
from a weighted average of the cash and asset prices at a constant value of B/V.
The weights are given by the shares of cash and asset gifts in the taxpayers
income class rather than the taxpayers own decision. If this were not done the
tax price would again
l
be endogenous. Most givers of capital assets also give
cash, a behavior which is inexplicable under the assumption that the marginal
cost of asset donatio~s is less than that of other gifts. Nevertheless, where
the data has been available subsequent studies have followed thiq lead.
The resulting equation, estiwated on 1970 tax return data yields:







where G is the deduction for charitable giving, Y-T is disposable income, P
is the marginal tax-price of giving, MAH is a marital status dUIIlIlW and AGE
equals one if at least one of the taxpayers is 65 or older. Standard errors are- 6 -
shown in parentheses. For this equation B/V is assumed to be .5, although
other values yield similar results.
The price coefficient of -1.28 implies that each dollar of lost revenue
stimulates more than a dollar of charitable giving, i.e. that it is in SOllie
sense "efficient" to allow a deduction for giving. The low income coefficient
implies that giving is an inferior good.
Because giving is observed only for itemizers, taxpayers who take the stan-
dard deduction are typically excluded from the regression. Since charitable
giving influences the decision to itemize, this rule induces some sample selec-
tion bias. Clotfelter (1980) suggests including only those taxpayers who would
itemize for any level of giving. The resulting selection, based as it is solely
on independent variables, does not introduce any bias if the model is otherwise
correct.
Essentially all subsequent studies have adopted a constant elasticity.
specification, with only the minimal changes necessary to adapt it to the
available data.
Because 95% of (unweighted) returns with itemized deductions show some
charitable giving, the potential problel~ of a limited dependent variable are
avoided. Reece (1979) worked with the Consumer Expenditure Survey. The CES
includes data on giving for itemizers and non-itemizers' alike, and because the
CES sample is not dominated by high-income households it includes many non-
givers. Reece uses a Tobit estimator appropriate to this situation and
generally confirms the earlier results.
Detailed demographic, consumption and wealth data fro~ the 1963 Survey of
Consumer Finance were used by Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) but this did not
much affect the estilliated price elasticity of givinb , which rel~ined at about- 7 -
minus one in essential~all specifications. Clotfelter (1980) has a seven year
panel of tax returns. A panel allows the estimation of separate permanent and
transitor,y income elasticities, a fixed effects model, and a -partial adjustment
model. All of these equations show considerab~ lower price elasticities (in
the range (-.3) - (-.5)) than did the ~nnual models. Nevertheless, the signifi-
cance of the price coefficient is established in all studies since the first.
III. An IV Estimator
We assume a true model of the form
g = (y ~) + 11 [y,p,w) .....
where g is charitable giving, y
., 12
~s ~ncome, p is the tax-price and w is
some (possibly random) function of y. The tax-price has a deterministic part
non-linearly dependent on y and a random part independent of such personal
characteristics. All three variables are measured as deviations from means. A
general nonlinear form for the regression would be much more difficult. This
specification restricts p to enter linear~ without restricting the form in
which any other explanator,y variable may enter.13
In the absence of any knowledge of w, the siwplified regression
g = [y,p) (~)+e
has been estimated. Following the standard demonstration of omitted variable
bias yields:- 8 -
where 0 is the vector of coefficients from a regression of w on y and p.
That is, ~ is biased to the extent that the price of charitable giving is




Pi be the mean tax price of giving, over a fixed set of taxpayers
subject to the laws of the state of residence for taxpayer i. Therefore p.
~
takes on one of several values depending upon the tax laws at the residence of
the taxpayer but independent of his own income. Nevertheless, it is correlated
with his own tax-price, and therefore may serve as an instrumental variable.
The standard instrumental variable estilJJ8.tor is:
(~)= ([y,PJ'[y,p])-l [y,PJ'g




T + co a -
1 (y:;) ([y,p]' [y,p])- [y,p]' [y,p,w] ...- 9 -
Factor out w to obtain
plim (~) = ([y,P1 I [y,pI )-l[y,p) I[y,p,I (:)
,.." #IV 1 #IV





By hypothesis plim (yIp) and plim (p'w) are zero, therefore:
A·
and plim a= aitself, while a'remains biased
It is usual to suppose that specification error of this kind will affect
all of the estimated coefficient~ adverse~: That it does not in this case is
due to the hypothesized orthogonality of pto y and w.
Notice that the instrument is not the average price of giving in each
state. That depends upon the distribution of income in each state as well as
the state law. Since states are known to have different levels of income (and
therefore quite different average federal tax rates) this would not be indepen-
dent of the other explanatory variable. Of course, if states vary in income, it- 10 -
is possible that they vary systematically in their residents' taste for chari-
table giving. Examination of this possibility is beyond the scope of this
paper, but it should be noted that this limited independence assuwption is also
inherent in the traditional OLS tax-price regression.
IV. State Income Taxes
Out of 51 states (including the District of Columbia), a total of 46 levied
some form of personal income tax in 1977. Only Nebraska's simple excise tax on
federal liabilities was completely dependent upon the federal definitions of
income and deductions. The remaining 45 states all exercised at least nominal
independence from the federal definition of taxable income, and of course the
bracket rates are quite independent of any coordination. A number of long con-
sidered changes in the federal law are alreaqy in place in some state tax codes,
including inflation indexing, optional separate filing for married couples,
vanishing exemptions, full taxation (or complete exemption) of realized capit~l
gains, and complete elimination of personal deductions. Although smaller in
magnitude than the federal leyy marginal tax rates are definitely non-trivial,
ranging up to 14% in New York and over 10% in seven other states.
In 33 states charitable giving is deductible from taxable inco~e, providing
a direct tax subsidy smaller in magnitude than the federal incentive but iden-
tical in form is provided for such gifts. state subsidy rates are shown in
Table 1 for several income levels. The taxpayer is assumed to be filing jointly
with federal itemized deductions of $3,200 or 24 percent of income (whichever is
larger). The entries show the dollar reduction in state tax liability associ-
ated with a $100 increase in giving. The indirect effect of the change in-11-
Ta b Ie 1
Federal and State Marginal Subsidy Rates for Charitable Giving
at Various Income Levels.
1977 Law Is Applied. Other Deductions are 24% of Income
(or $3.200. whichever Is greater>.































































































































































































































































































































federal liability on state taxes is included where relevant. In Minnesota, for
example, federal taxes are deductible from state taxable income, this results in
a surprising decrease in tax rates at higher incomes. Because the IV estimator
uses for variance across states rather than across income classes, the variety
of subsidy rates is gratifying. Eight states have rates above 10% for at least
some taxpayers, while 18 have zero rates for all residents.
With the partial exception of Feldstein and Taylor (1976) previous studies
have neglected the role of state taxes in charitable giving. Notice that both
the price of giving and disposable income are affected. Feldstein and Taylor
considered only the first; furthermore, the calculation of the marginal rate was
crude by comparison with the detailed iraplementat'ion of the federal law. The
effect of either omission on the estimated coefficients is ambiguous because the
correlation between state and federal tax rates (which would bias the coef-
ficients away from zero) might overwhelm the pure errors-in-variable tendency to
depress coefficients.
As part of NBER's general program in state and local taxation we have pre-
pared Fortran programs for calculating state tax liabilities from federal Form
1040 data, as available to us. In spite of the diversity of state laws, the
information on the 1040 is sufficient to model the state laws quite closely.
While the tax treatment of individual items may vary across states, in most
cases the definitions are those of the federal law. 'PresUmab~ this stems more
from a desire to lean on IRS auditing and document matching than on a universal
belief in the correctness of those definitions. In any case, most deviations
from the federal definitions occur in calculated quantities rather than the
basic data. For example, state income taxes are deductible on the federal- 13 -
return but not on most state tax returns. Nevertheless the state income tax
deduction is a separate line on the 1040 and this makes possible an accurate
calculation of the state itemized deductions. The major exception to this rule
is the treatment of interest on government debt. Interest on state and local
debt is not taxed by the federal government and is not shown on the 1040.
Treasury debt is not taxed by the states, but neither is it broken out on the
federal return. Since essential~ nothing is known about the distribution of
holdings of these debts no attempt was made to adjust for this discrepancy.
Deductions and credits for local property taxes are a feature of many state
income tax laws; this presents no problem. Some states extend these provisions
to renters, usually by iwputing some fraction of rent to property taxes. (The
fraction is independent of the local tax rate, however!) Although rent payments
could easily be imputed to taxp~ers based o~ their income, this has not yet
been implemented.
The state of residence code is taken from the address field of the tax
return and is also subject to error. Taxpayers may move, or work in another
state (and be subject to that tax law) or might give the address of a bank or
attorney in another state.
The accuracy of the federal tax calculation is readi~ checked by co~
parison with the tax liability reported by the taxpayer. These match precise~
with a few exceptions. The itemized deduction for state "income taxes is not a
usable check on the state tax liability, because it records cash payments rather
than accrued liabilities. That is, it records this years withholding plus net
underwithholding for the previous year. Aggregate estimates (by state) of
liability from the 1977 calendar year Tax Model data and the TAXSIM program for- 14 -
each state may be compared to reported aggregate revenues for fiscal year 1978
(Tax Foundation, 1979) to get a rough idea of the accuracy of the calculation.
In 25 of 44 states the difference between revenues and estimated liability
exceeded one standard error of estimate and 12 exceeded two such intervals.
The Tax Foundation has been kind enough to supply worksheets showing the calcu-
lation of. state income taxes in ever,y state for 8 hypothetical individuals.
Aside from the problems mentioned above, these figures match those from TAXSIM.
The reciprocal deductibility of state and federal taxes on federal and
state tax returns does not create true simultaneity because the federal deduc-
tion is based on taxes paid rather than tax liability incurred. Nevertheless it
seemed natural to include the effect on future tax liabilities in the current
price of giving. In states that allow a deduction for federal taxes there is a
series of consequences of each tax on the other continuing until the taxp~er
takes the optional standard deduction. The talX-price model adopted here is:
p = = l-(t + t - at t ) s f s f
where t, s, and f subscripts indicate total, state and federal marginal
rates and a equals one or two as the state denies or allows a deduction for
federal taxes. The state and federal rates are each composed from separate
rates for cash and assets according to the procedure in Section II. This cuts
off the series after one go-round, ignores the possibility of discounting future
tax reductions, and presumes that this year's federal tax rate is a good pro~
for next year's rate.14
The average tax rates in each state, for a fixed distribution of income and
deduction amounts, are calculated from a single random subset of 383 taxpayers-15 -
from the main Tax Model file. Separate tax rates for gifts of cash and assets
are calculated. They enter as instruments separately.
v. Results
Our basic dataset is a one in ten subsample of the 1977 file. The original
file is censored to maintain the confidentiality of possibly recognizable
returns and excludes taxpayers with adjusted gross income of more than $200,000.
The regression sample is further restricted by the exclusion of taxpayers whose
non-charitable deductions are less than the standard deduction, and b,y the eli-
mination of a handful of taxp~ers with non-positive disposable income.
An OLS regression on the new dataset using the conventional specification
previously dominant in the literature yields the estimated equation:
In(G+10) = -2.83
(.43)
+ .78 In(Y-T) - .79 In(P)
(.04) (.12)





Restricting the model to a sample of married couples less than 65 years
old yields equation (2):





These price elasticities are substantially less than those reported by
Feldstein and Taylor or Clotfelter for similar data and an identical specifica-
tion. If (1) is modified to include only federal taxes, there is a slight chan5e- 16-
in the coefficients, but this is not the source of the discreyancy. The addi-
tion of records from the National Tax Model with adJusted gross income exceedinb
$200,000 (without state tax rates) has similarly little effect on the point
estimates. It does, however, improve the fit and standard errors to figures
close to those .reported before.
It is not possible to defeat the price effect by the simple addition of
interaction terms and squares (of the continuous variables). That exercise
yields the equation:
























which implies a price elasticity of -1.15 (significant at the 5% level). Adding
a proxy for wealth (25 times dividend income plus 12 times interest income) to
equation (1) does have a dramatic effect, however:












Although price remains significant the point estimate is now much smaller than
aQY reported since Taussig.
The instrumental variable equivalent to (1) using as instruments the state











For the married, less than 65 subset the IV estiwate is:






The expected loss of efficiency has more than tripled the standard error on
the price coefficient, however the resulting point estimate is significantly
different from zero and not significantly different from one. The IV estimates
therefore provide rough confirmation of the importance of the tax-price in
determining charitable giving.
The wealth proxy almost eliminates the price coefficient in the 018
equation, but in the equivalent IV equation:












R2 = 21 .
the point estimate is still quite respectable. Here is the equation for the











Life-cycle considerations suggest that the wealth pro~ cannot be
arbitrarily excluded so equation (4) casts some doubt on the importance of
income tax deductability on charitable giving. The IV estimate shows that this
impotence is an artifact of the correlation between the wealth proxy and the
tax-price.
VI. Conclusion
Our estimate of 1.23 (for equation (7» as the price elasticity of chari-
table giving is not significantly different from earlier estimates based on tax
return data. Because the IV estimator is robust to ma~ specification errors,
including the incorrect choice of functional form or the exclusion of variables
affecting tax liability, this result strengthens the belief that taxes are an
important determinant of charitable giving in the United States.
This is an expensive procedure, both in time and in statistical efficiency,
and in the absence of any evidence for bias in the traditional specification the
argument for the general adoption of this technique is weakened. Nor does the
result imply a~thing for tax-price models of labor supply, capital gains reali-
zations, or housing tenure choice. Nevertheless, it represents useful confir-
mation of a technique -- the tax-price re~ression
valuable in a broad range of public finance issues.
which has proven extremely- 19 -
Footnotes
1. Clotfelter (1980), Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981), Feldstein (1976),
Feldstein and Taylor (1976), Reece (1979).
2. Rosen (1979), King (1980).
3. Feldstein and Yitzhaki (1978), Feldstein, S~emrod and Yitzhaki (1980).
4. Nakamura (1981), Rosen (1976)
5. Rosen (1976) tests and strong~ rejects the use of pre-tax wage rates in a
labor supply equation when post-tax wage rates are known.
6. A similar issue affects the interpretation of regressions corrected for
sample selection bias through the inclusion of a predicted hazard rate
among the independent variables (Hechman 1980). The predicted hazard rate
is a function of the remaining independent variables, and its effectiveness
as a correction for sample selection bias is based on the a priori assump-
tion that nonlinear terJllS in the independent variable could safe~ have
been excluded from the uncensored model.
7. The remedy is not simply to adopt a more general functional form. The tax
price coefficient may be robbed of its significance if a sufficiently
general functional form is chosen including all relevant variables, but
such an exercise does not begin to answer the question of which variables
belong in the equation and which are mere~ colinear with them.
8. These files are prepared annually qy the Internal Revenue Service (1977)
for static simulations of the revenue effects of changes in the tax law.
The stratification overrepresents small states and large incomes to achieve
this end economically. Essential~ everything on the Form 1040 (the basic
tax form) is included, together with a few iteQ5 from each of several sup-
porting schedules. Sample size has ranged from 140,000 to 160,000 returns.
These files are available to aqyone for a nominal fee from the National
Archives.
9. Tax return data are as poor in demographic information as they are rich in
income information. The number of dependent children, marital status, and
the number of taxpayers (one or two) who are 65 years of age or older are
the on~ items available. Age, race and sex are available in a special
1972 match with Social Security records. This file does not include fami-
lies with income over $100,000 and it has not, to ~ knowledge been used in
any charity study.
10. Taussig worked with an incomplete version of Tax r-bdel, and this may have
played a seconda~ role in the negative findin6.- 20 -
11. To be strictly correct these first dollar rates should have been used as
instruments ·for the endogenous rates rather than as substitutes. If, as
might be expected, the first dollar rates have less variance than the
actual rate, then the tax price coefficient is biased up.
12. The generalization to multiple personal characteristics is straightfor-
ward.
13. White (1982) discusses the possibility of approximating an unknown non-
linear regression function by a linear regression on a Taylor expansion,
but he is not encouragine;.
14. It might be a very bad proxy if the taxp~er failed to i te.uli.ze the
following year.- 21 _
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